The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid Leave and Work Absences by Callison, Kevin & Pesko, Michael F.
Upjohn Research 
Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 
10-17-2017 
The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid Leave 
and Work Absences 
Kevin Callison 
Tulane University 
Michael F. Pesko 
Georgia State University 
Upjohn Institute working paper ; 16-265 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons 
Citation 
Callison, Kevin and Michael F. Pesko. 2017. "The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid 
Leave and Work Absences." Upjohn Institute Working Paper 16-265. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp16-265 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
  
 
The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates 
on Access to Paid Leave and Work Absences 
 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 16-265 
 
Kevin Callison 
Tulane University 
E-mail: kcallison@tulane.edu 
 
Michael F. Pesko 
Georgia State University 
E-mail: mpesko@gsu.edu 
 
November 7, 2016 
Revised October 17, 2017 
Previously issued under the title: 
The Effect of Mandatory Paid Sick Leave Laws on Labor Market Outcomes, 
Health Care Utilization, and Health Behaviors 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We evaluate the impact of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates on access to PSL and work absences for 
private sector workers in the U.S. By exploiting geographic and temporal variation in PSL mandate 
enactment, we compare changes in outcomes for workers in counties affected by a PSL mandate to 
changes for those in counties with no mandate. Additionally, we rely on within-county variation in the 
propensity to gain PSL following a mandate to estimate policy effects for workers most likely to 
acquire coverage. Results indicate that PSL mandates lead to increased access to PSL benefits, 
especially for women and those working in industries where workers historically lacked access to PSL. 
We also find that PSL laws increase work absences for those most likely to gain coverage, but reduce 
absences for others. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: I18, I12, J21, J23, J32 
 
Key Words: Paid sick leave, labor market, absenteeism 
 
Acknowledgments:  This research was supported by a grant from the W.E. Upjohn Institute’s Early 
Career Research Award Program (#16-151-02). We thank Joanna Seirup and Manyao Zhang for 
outstanding research assistance. We are grateful to Michael French and Nicolas Ziebarth for their 
feedback and suggestions. We also thank participants at the 2017 International Health Economics 
Association’s World Congress and the Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management’s 2017 Fall 
Research Conference for their helpful comments. 
 
Upjohn Institute working papers are meant to stimulate discussion and criticism among the 
policy research community. Content and opinions are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
 
 
 
The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid Leave 
and Work Absences 
 
 
Kevin Callison* 
Tulane University          
 
Michael F. Pesko 
Georgia State University 
 
 
October 17, 2017 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We evaluate the impact of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates on access to PSL and work absences for 
private sector workers in the U.S. By exploiting geographic and temporal variation in PSL mandate 
enactment, we compare changes in outcomes for workers in counties affected by a PSL mandate to 
changes for those in counties with no mandate. Additionally, we rely on within-county variation in the 
propensity to gain PSL following a mandate to estimate policy effects for workers most likely to 
acquire coverage. Results indicate that PSL mandates lead to increased access to PSL benefits, 
especially for women and those working in industries where workers historically lacked access to PSL. 
We also find that PSL laws increase work absences for those most likely to gain coverage, but reduce 
absences for others. 
 
 
JEL Classification Codes: I18, I12, J21, J23, J32 
 
Key Words: Paid sick leave, labor market, absenteeism 
  
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
This research was supported by a grant from the W.E. Upjohn Institute’s Early Career Research 
Award Program (#16-151-02). We thank Joanna Seirup and Manyao Zhang for outstanding research 
assistance. We are grateful to Michael French and Nicolas Ziebarth for their feedback and 
suggestions. We also thank participants at the 2017 International Health Economics Association’s 
World Congress and the Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management’s 2017 Fall Research 
Conference for their helpful comments. 
																																																						
* Callison: Tulane University, School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine & Department of Economics, 1440 Canal 
St., New Orleans, LA 70112; email kcallison@tulane.edu. Pesko: Georgia State University, Department of Economics, 
P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302; email mpesko@gsu.edu.  
	 1	
1. Introduction 
 
The United States is one of only two OECD countries with no federal mandate guaranteeing 
workers access to paid sick leave (PSL) (World Policy Analysis Center, 2016).1 At the local level, 
proliferation of PSL mandates has continued since San Francisco enacted the first municipal PSL 
legislation in 2006, while Connecticut became the first state to require that employers provide PSL 
benefits in 2012 followed by California, Massachusetts, and Oregon (National Partnership for 
Women & Families 2016).2 Renewed efforts to establish federally mandated PSL access in the U.S. 
culminated in the reintroduction of the Healthy Families Act to Congress in 2015.3 The legislation, 
were it to become law, would establish a national standard regulating the provision of PSL benefits 
for qualified workers. Furthermore, an executive order signed by President Obama that required 
firms with federal government contracts to provide employees with up to 7 paid annual sick days 
took effect in 2017. Alternatively, 19 states have passed legislation that preemptively blocks 
municipalities from enacting local PSL mandates and the expansion of PSL through legislative 
regulation has become a contentious political issue. Though it is not uncommon for firms to offer 
employees PSL benefits in the absence of a federal or local mandate, estimates suggest that nearly 40 
percent of private sector workers in the U.S. currently lack PSL coverage (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2016).  
While public opinion polls indicate strong support for mandated PSL benefits, opponents 
argue that PSL regulations are costly to employers and reduce worker hours by encouraging 
absenteeism (Jones et al., 2014; Nelson, 2014; Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017b).4 Unfortunately, evidence 
																																																						
1 South Korea is the other OECD country that lacks federal PSL legislation. 
2 See Appendix Table 1 for a detailed description of these paid sick leave mandates. 
3 The Healthy Families Act was originally introduced to Congress in 2004 and then again in 2013. 
4 For examples of public opinion polls of paid sick leave support see: Huffington Post/YouGov Paid Sick Leave Poll, 
June 2013; Lake Research Partners Poll, January 2015; Pew Research Center, March 2017, “Americans Widens Support 
Paid Family and Medical Leave, but Differ Over Specific Policies”. 
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to support a causal link between PSL mandates and absenteeism is sparse given that nearly every 
study of the relationship between PSL access and labor outcomes has analyzed legislation adopted 
outside the U.S. (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Puhani and Sonderhof, 2010; Ziebarth and 
Karlsson, 2010; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2014). These foreign laws are largely dissimilar to the 
proposed and recently enacted U.S. statutes and serve as poor models for the effects of expanded 
PSL generosity in the U.S. 
 Our paper adds to a small, but growing literature examining the employment effects of PSL 
mandates in the U.S. Specifically, we use the enactment of local and state level mandates to evaluate 
the relationship between PSL mandates and access to paid work leave for private sector workers. 
After establishing that PSL mandates lead to coverage expansions, we then estimate the effect of 
PSL mandates on illness-related work absences. Our findings make two contributions to the study 
of the labor market effects of PSL mandates. We provide the first estimates of the coverage effects 
of PSL mandates at the local and state levels in the U.S. Understanding how PSL mandates translate 
into increased access to paid leave is a crucial first step for any analysis of the long-run effects of 
PSL regulations. Secondly, we quantify the impact of increased access to PSL on worker 
absenteeism in the U.S. The ex-ante effect of access to paid leave on work absences is unclear. The 
availability of PSL reduces the cost of absenteeism to workers, thus potentially increasing the 
likelihood of a work absence (Gilleskie, 1998). However, in the presence of a communicable illness, 
increased access to PSL could also reduce “presenteeism” or attending work while sick (Johns, 2010, 
Susser and Ziebarth, 2016). For example, fewer sick employees in the workplace could limit the 
spread of a communicable illness and lead to fewer work absences (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a). 
  We first establish that PSL mandates lead to economically significant increases in access to 
paid leave using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the Current Population 
Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) from 2005 to 2015. Relying on 
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geographic and temporal variation in mandate adoption, we estimate difference-in-differences (DD) 
models comparing outcomes for those living in counties affected by PSL mandates to those living in 
counties with no mandate in place. Since workers often have PSL benefits in the absence of a 
legislative mandate, we refine our analysis by predicting the probability of gaining PSL after a 
mandate takes effect and using this predicted probability to estimate a triple-differences (DDD) 
model comparing within-county changes in work absences after mandate enactment for those with a 
high probability of gaining coverage to those with a low probability of gaining coverage. This 
method is an improvement over traditional DD estimates of the effect of PSL mandates that fail to 
focus on workers targeted by the legislation.  
 We then turn to estimates of the effect of PSL mandates on illness-related work absences. 
Our results indicate that workers gaining access to PSL following a mandate exhibit substantial 
increases in illness-related work absences at both the extensive and intensive margins. We find 
similar patterns among newly covered workers in both the NHIS and CPS-ASEC samples. 
However, these absences are largely offset by a reduction in illness-related work absences for 
populations that traditionally have access to paid leave and are not directly affected by the enactment 
of a mandate. This finding supports the notion that access to PSL lowers rates of presenteeism for 
those gaining coverage, limiting the spread of communicable illnesses, and resulting in fewer illness-
related work absences for others. These results have significant implications for the current debate 
over the expansion of PSL benefits to workers in the U.S. While the direct cost to employers of 
providing paid leave may be large, we show that increased access to PSL generates positive spillovers 
that act to offset these direct costs and have the potential to improve the health of the workforce. 
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2. Labor Market Effects of Paid Leave Policies 
 
Since PSL mandates are a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S., studies of the labor 
market effects of mandated leave policies have generally focused on two related areas: paid leave 
mandates surrounding childbirth and unpaid access to sick leave. Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and 
Waldfogel (2012) and Baum and Ruhm (2016) examined changes in maternal and paternal paid leave 
following the enactment of California’s 2004 Paid Family Leave program. Both studies found that 
access to paid family leave increased leave-taking on the intensive margin, while Das and Polachek 
(2015) found persistent negative effects on women’s employment. We note that the applicability of 
these studies to the case of PSL for all workers is questionable since work absences related to 
childbirth are largely planned in advance.  
Evidence of the effect of access to unpaid leave on work absences is mixed. The Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 guaranteed eligible workers access to unpaid, job-protected 
employment leave for circumstances including a serious health condition that impedes job 
performance, childbirth, or the care of a close relative with a serious health condition (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2016).5 Waldfogel (1999) analyzed the effect of the FMLA on work absences, 
employment, and earnings. She found that the FMLA increased instances of leave-taking, but had 
no effect on changes in employment or wages. Alternatively, using the FMLA and prior state-level 
unpaid leave mandates, Baum (2003) reported that unpaid leave mandates had no effect on leave-
taking for mothers who had recently given birth. Also examining unpaid parental leave, Han, Ruhm, 
and Waldfogel (2009) found that expansions in access to unpaid leave increased leave-taking for 
both mothers and fathers. Because the FMLA provides unpaid leave and covers less than half of 
																																																						
5 An eligible worker is defined as a worker in a firm with 50 or more employees working at least 1,250 hours in the 12 
months prior to taking leave.  
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private sector workers, it is unclear whether these earlier findings of the effects of FMLA on work 
absences extend to the recent PSL mandates adopted by states and municipalities in the U.S. 
Research on the labor market effects of paid leave mandates has generally focused on 
European countries where mandated benefits have been in place for several years and administrative 
data on paid leave access and work absences is more widely available than in the U.S. Henrekson 
and Persson (2004) concluded that increases in sick leave generosity in Sweden were related to 
increased absenteeism over an extended period from 1955 to 1999. Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) 
investigated German legislation that initially reduced and then later expanded opportunities for PSL. 
The authors reported that decreasing sick pay from 100 percent to 80 percent of wages resulted in a 
reduction of 2.4 sick days per year on average. Similarly, examining the same reduction in German 
sick pay, Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) reported that the share of workers with zero work absences 
increased between 6 percent and 8 percent, while Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014) found that restoring 
German sick pay to 100 percent of wages led to a 10 percent increase in work absences. 
Due to the novelty of PSL mandates in the U.S., few studies have examined labor market 
effects of paid leave access for U.S workers. Using a survey of employers in San Francisco, Colla et 
al. (2014) found that the share of firms providing PSL coverage to employees increased from 73% to 
91% following the enactment of a PSL mandate in 2007. However, it was not clear how many 
workers were affected by the policy change. Furthermore, San Francisco employers voluntarily 
offered PSL benefits at a relatively high rate prior to the mandate raising concerns over the 
applicability of these findings to other regions. Using a structural framework simulation, Gilleskie 
(1998) found that moving from no PSL coverage to full coverage would increase illness-related work 
absences by 45% per illness episode, but estimates from a reduced form model deviated substantially 
when she considered alternative policy scenarios that included combinations of PSL mandates and 
expanded health insurance coverage.  
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More recently, Ahn and Yelowtiz (2016) matched U.S. workers with and without access to 
PSL on various observable characteristics and found that PSL coverage led to approximately 1.2 
additional work absences per year. One concern with this identification strategy is that unobserved 
differences between those with and without access to PSL could bias the authors’ estimated effects. 
Because Ahn and Yelowtiz do not rely on the plausibly exogenous (to the worker) effect of PSL 
mandate enactment, estimates of within-region differences between those with and without PSL 
access are especially susceptible to omitted variable bias. In the same study, Ahn and Yelowitz 
estimated models that used exogenous measures of regional influenza infection rates to identify the 
effect of PSL access on absenteeism, which resulted in a smaller effect of 0.9 additional work 
absences per year. Finally, Pichler and Ziebarth (2017b) found no evidence that U.S. PSL mandates 
affected employment or wages, though the authors focused on all workers rather than those most 
likely to gain PSL access following the enactment of a mandate. We show below that this distinction 
has meaningful implications for the magnitude of the estimated effects of PSL mandates.  
 
3. Data 
The primary data source for our analysis of the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access and 
worker absences is the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) maintained by the National Center 
for Health Statistics (NCHS). The objective of the NHIS is to monitor the health of the U.S. 
population through the collection and analysis of data on a broad range of health and labor market 
topics. The NHIS is a cross-sectional household survey with continuous sampling and interviewing 
throughout the year, which follows a multistage area probability sampling design that permits the 
representative sampling of households and non-institutional group quarters (e.g. college dormitories) 
in the U.S. Data are collected through a personal household interview conducted by interviewers 
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employed and trained by the U.S. Census Bureau according to procedures specified by the NCHS 
(Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2016a).  
We rely on restricted access state- and county-identified NHIS data collected between 2005 and 
2015 for our analyses. Our sample is restricted to workers between the ages of 18 and 64 who are 
employed in the private sector and do not report being self-employed at the time of their interview.6 
To maintain consistency between our treatment counties (those enacting a PSL mandate) and our 
control counties (those with no PSL mandate), we further restrict our sample to urban counties as 
defined by the 2013 Urban-Rural Classification (CDC, 2014). The NHIS includes information on 
gender, race/ethnicity, education, poverty status, marital status, and health insurance coverage that 
we use to control for observable differences between individuals in our sample. We construct an 
indicator that is equal to one for those living in counties that enacted a PSL mandate after the 
mandate became effective and is equal to zero otherwise.7 
Our outcome measure for PSL access is derived from a question that asks those currently 
employed, “Do you have paid sick leave on this main job or business?”. We measure work absences 
using a question that asks, “During the past 12 months, about how many days did you miss work at 
a job or business because of illness or injury (do not include maternity leave)?”. It is important to 
note that this question does not include all work absences, but specifically addresses absences due to 
illness or injury. Finally, to our NHIS sample we merge data on the number of physicians per capita 
(general practitioners, family practitioners, and all MDs), the number of inpatient days per capita, 
and the number of outpatient physician visits per capita from the Area Health Resource Files 
																																																						
6 Our analysis is limited to private sector workers because nearly all public-sector workers already have access to PSL. 
We exclude individuals in the following employment categories: looking for work; working, but not for pay, at a family-
owned job or business; not working at a job or business and not looking for work; employees of federal/state/local 
government; and self-employed in own business, professional practice, or farm. 
7 Without more precise geographic information, we measure municipal PSL mandate adoption at the county level so that 
a county is included in our treatment group if a city within that county has enacted a PSL mandate. We expect the 
measurement error introduced from this definition of PSL to be small considering that the city/county boundaries for 
San Francisco, Washington DC, and New York City fully overlap. 
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(AHRF); county-level Medicare fee-for-service parts A and B per-capita spending from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services; and county-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). We include data on the supply of physicians and on health care expenditures, 
along with controls for individual insurance coverage, to address concerns with access-related 
changes and insurance expansions resulting from the implementation of provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act that occurred contemporaneously with some of the PSL mandates that we 
study. 
While the NHIS has clear advantages for our analysis, one drawback to this particular dataset is 
its relatively small sample size (approximately 3,700 workers per year remain after sample 
restrictions). To address issues associated with precision arising from a smaller sample, we conduct a 
complementary analysis using data form the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) between 2005 and 2015. Unfortunately, the CPS has limited 
available information on access to paid sick leave, but the survey does include questions related to 
worker absences. Specifically, the CPS-ASEC asks workers who were absent from work the previous 
week the reason for their absence. We use this variable to construct an indicator for a work absence 
in the past week and an indicator for a work absence in the past week due to “own illness, injury, or 
medical problems”. We combine the CPS-ASEC sample with the AHRF, Medicare, and BLS data 
described above.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our NHIS sample separately for those living in counties 
that enacted a PSL mandate (treatment counties) and those living in counties with no PSL mandate 
(control counties). Counties that enact PSL mandates tend to have more highly educated 
populations, more residents earning 400% of the federal poverty level or above, and more residents 
with Medicaid coverage, while those living in control counties are more likely to lack insurance 
coverage.  
	 9	
 
4. Empirical Framework 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of PSL laws on PSL access and work 
absences using a difference-in-difference (DD) strategy that exploits the temporal and geographic 
variation in the timing of the enactment of PSL mandates. The relationship between PSL mandates 
and our outcomes of interest is formalized as follows: 
 
(1) !",$,% = ' + )*+,$,% + -.",$,% + /0$,% + 1$ + 2% + 1$×2% + 4",$,%     
 
where Y is the outcome of interest for person i in county c at year-quarter t; PSL is an indicator for 
the enactment of a PSL mandate in any part of year-quarter t ;8 X is a vector of individual 
characteristics (sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, and 
industry of employment); Z is a vector of time-varying county-level factors (physician supply, 
inpatient and outpatient days, FFS Medicare spending, and the unemployment rate); δc is a county 
fixed effect, 2% is a year-quarter fixed effect, and δc * 2%   represents a county-specific linear time trend 
which is included in our preferred specifications. Equation (1) represents a standard DD analysis 
where outcomes in our treatment regions (i.e., counties and states enacting a PSL mandate) are 
compared to control regions that have no PSL laws in place. We cluster our standard errors at the 
county level in all analyses. 
Our dependent variable, !",$,% in Equation (1) represents one of several possible outcomes. 
We initially estimate the effect of PSL laws on access to PSL measured by whether a worker in our 
sample reports having PSL benefits at their main job. Our hypothesis is that a PSL mandate should 
																																																						
8 We define enactment of a PSL mandate as the year-quarter in which the mandate actually took effect. 
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increase the share of workers reporting access to PSL. However, if PSL mandate adoption is focused 
in areas where private employers display a high likelihood of offering PSL, then we may find a 
relatively small effect of the mandate. Additionally, employers may attempt to avoid a mandate by 
relocating or restructuring their workforce, which would also negate access effects of a mandate.  
After examining the effect of PSL mandates on worker access to paid leave, we then 
estimate the effect of mandates on work absences using both the NHIS and CPS-ASEC data. In the 
NHIS data, we examine changes in the probability of reporting any work absences due to illness or 
injury (excluding pregnancy-related absences) in the past 12 months, 2 or more work absences, 5 or 
more work absences, and 10 or more work absences. The CPS-ASEC does not include information 
on the intensive margin of work absences, so we are only able to analyze changes in the probability 
of any work absence in the past week. Another modification we make when examining work 
absences is to exclude the first 12 months after the mandate took effect. This is because all of the 
mandates in our study include provisions requiring workers to accrue PSL over an extended period 
of time (e.g. 1 hour of PSL for every 30 hours worked). We therefore expect any effect of PSL 
mandates on work absences to be delayed as a result of these accrual periods. This pattern is 
confirmed in event study estimates presented below. Results for work absences that include the year 
of adoption are similar to our main results, though the magnitude of the effect is attenuated. These 
estimates are available upon request. 
A potential challenge to the validity of our DD specification is the endogenous adoption of 
PSL mandates. For example, if a municipality’s population demographics (e.g., share of service 
industry workers or underlying health of the population) are changing over time in unobserved ways, 
and this change leads to the adoption of a PSL mandate, then our estimates of the effect of PSL 
legislation on labor market and health outcomes would be biased. To gauge the potential for policy 
exogeneity we use data from the CPS-ASEC along with information on county-level, unemployment 
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rates, and proxies for population health to regress PSL adoption on several observable county-level 
characteristics that would plausibly be related to the adoption of a PSL mandate.9 Specifically, we 
examine the association between the enactment of a PSL law and county-level estimates of 
population age, race/ethnicity, education, and income; per capita hospital inpatient days, per capita 
outpatient visits, and total Medicare spending for parts A and B;10 county-level unemployment rates; 
and industry of employment. While not a definitive test of the exogeneity of the PSL mandates that 
we study, an inability to explain the variation in the adoption of PSL laws with a rich set of 
observable population characteristics lends support to our assertion that our identification strategy 
returns causal estimates of the effect of PSL mandates (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Hoynes 
and Schanzenbach, 2012). 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 2. Column (1), which omits county fixed 
effects and county time trends, indicates that the share of the population with VA health insurance 
coverage and the share of the population working in agricultural industries is negatively associated 
with the enactment of a PSL mandate (p<0.05). The addition of county fixed effects in Column (2) 
attenuates the explanatory power of our industry indicators and leaves only gender, race, V.A. 
coverage, and Medicare spending as moderately significant predictors of PSL mandates. Finally, we 
add county time trends in Column (3) and find that only Medicare spending is associated with PSL 
mandate adoption. If the positive association between Medicare spending and PSL regulation 
indicates that counties with unobservably sicker populations were more likely to adopt a PSL 
mandate, then estimates of the effect of PSL adoption on health care utilization could be biased. 
However, we control for Medicare spending in our preferred specifications to minimize any 
																																																						
9 We choose to use the CPS-ASEC rather than the NHIS sample for this analysis due to the CPS-ASEC’s much larger 
sample size. 
10 We would prefer to use county-level estimates of health care expenditures for the entire population; however, we are 
unaware of any such data that span the time frame of our analysis. Instead, we use Medicare parts A and B spending as a 
proxy for total health care expenditures.  
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potential bias that might arise. We also note that, despite the inclusion of county fixed effects and 
county time trends in Column (3), the R-squared indicates that much of the variation in PSL 
mandate adoption is unexplained by demographic and county-level observables and, therefore, 
suggests substantial random variation in PSL adoption to be leveraged in our estimation strategy. 
In addition to policy exogeneity, another necessary assumption for the validity of our DD 
model is that the treatment and control groups would have followed the same trends (in terms of 
the outcome variables) had the adoption of a PSL mandate not occurred. This assumption is 
untestable, as it is impossible to observe the treatment group in the untreated state during the post-
treatment period; however, evidence that these two groups followed similar trends in the outcome 
variables in the pre-PSL period lends credence to our estimation strategy. To assess whether trends 
in our outcomes were similar in the pre-enactment period for our treatment and control counties, 
we estimate a model similar to Equation (1) that replaces the PSL term with an interaction between 
an indicator for whether a county ever enacts a PSL mandate and a continuous measure of the year-
quarter limiting the sample to the years before PSL mandates went into effect. A lack of statistical 
significance on this interaction term indicates that no measurable difference in pre-policy trends 
exists between the treatment and control counties. We report the results of this parallel trends test 
along with our estimates of Equation (1) below. 
 
5. Results & Supplementary Analyses 
Before turning to our DD estimates from Equation (1), we present unadjusted visual evidence of 
the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access and work absences in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the 
share of workers who report that they have access to PSL at their main job for those in both the 
treatment and control counties. Figure 1 is centered about the year-quarter of PSL mandate 
enactment for the treatment counties and a “pseudo-enactment” period for the control counties that 
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randomly assigns each control county to the year-quarter of mandate enactment for a county in the 
treatment group. The visual evidence in Figure 1 suggests that workers in counties that would go on 
to enact a PSL mandate had greater access to PSL in the periods before the mandates took effect. 
Pre-period trends in PSL access are relatively similar for the treatment and control counties, though 
the treatment counties show signs of increasing PSL access in the year immediately preceding the 
enactment of a mandate. Despite this potential evidence of policy anticipation in the unadjusted 
means, we find no evidence of diverging trends in the pre-period in our regression analyses or in 
event-study estimates of work absences discussed below. Figure 1 suggests that after the PSL 
mandates took effect, workers in the treatment counties were more likely to report having access to 
PSL and that PSL access continued to increase for the first 3 years before a slight downturn between 
years 3 and 4 post-enactment. Workers in the control counties show no similar increase in PSL 
access.  
Figure 2 plots the share of workers with a work absence in the past 12 months due to an illness 
or injury. The share of workers reporting at least one work absence in both the treatment and 
control counties increased between 4 and 2 years prior to PSL mandate enactment, with a larger 
increase for those in treatment counties, before leveling off in the two years immediately preceding 
the PSL mandates. Workers in treatment counties show no significant change in work absences in 
the year following a PSL mandate, but the share of workers with at least one absence over the past 
12 months rises steeply in treatment counties after the first year. This pattern is consistent with the 
requirement that workers must accrue PSL hours over time and motivates our decision to exclude 
the first 12 months post-enactment in our regression analyses of work absences. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of PSL mandate adoption on the probability of reporting 
access to PSL. Results in the first column in Table 3 are from a specification that omits controls for 
industry of employment, time-varying county characteristics, and county time trends. Panel A 
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contains the DD estimates of the effect of PSL mandates while Panel B includes the coefficient on 
the interaction term in our parallel trends test described earlier. Column (1) indicates that the 
enactment of a PSL mandate results in an increase in PSL access of 4.1 percentage points compared 
to counties with no mandate in effect. Based on a mean access rate of 58.5% in our sample, this 
represents a 7% increase in access to PSL. The specification in Column (2) adds separate controls 
for the 22 industry categories listed in Appendix Table 2. The inclusion of industry controls has little 
effect on the magnitude of the estimate. Column (3) adds our county level controls that include per 
capita measures of physician supply, health care utilization measures, Medicare FFS per capita 
spending, and the county unemployment rate. Our estimate remains largely unchanged after the 
addition of these county controls. Finally, Column (4) adds county time trends to further control for 
potential policy endogeneity or anticipation effects. Here our coefficient estimate is similar to 
Columns (1) through (3), but the inflated standard error in this specification results in a loss of 
statistical significance. In all four specifications, our parallel trends test finds no evidence that trends 
in PSL access were significantly different for treatment and control counties prior to the mandates 
taking effect.  
Motivated by evidence that women are more responsive than men to changes in PSL policies, 
we explore the possibility of heterogeneous impacts of PSL mandates in Table 4 (Henrekson and 
Persson, 2004). Here we split the sample into 5 subgroups and examine the effect of PSL mandates 
separately for: women, men, white non-Hispanics, non-whites or Hispanics, and workers in 
industries with historically low access to PSL.11 Regression specifications in Table 4 are analogous to 
Column (4) in Table 3 and include demographic, industry, and county controls, and county time 
trends. The results in Table 4 suggest that while the effect of PSL mandates may differ slightly 
																																																						
11 We define these low-access industries as those industries in which fewer than the overall mean share of workers report 
access to PSL prior to the enactment of a PSL mandate. See Appendix Table 2 for a complete listing of low-access 
industries. 
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across gender or race/ethnicity, the differences appear to be rather small. The coefficient estimate 
for PSL mandates is statistically significant at the 5% level for women and is not statistically 
significant for men, though the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively similar. White, non-
Hispanic workers see a 4.9 percentage point increase in PSL access as a result of a mandate 
compared to a 3.6 percentage point increase for non-white, Hispanic workers. Lastly, Column (5) 
indicates that, as expected, those working in industries where access to PSL was uncommon prior to 
a mandate see a large, 8 percentage point gain in PSL access following the enactment of a mandate.  
We next turn to the second phase of our analysis, which includes estimates of the effect of PSL 
mandates on work absences in the past 12 months due to illness or injury in Table 5. The odd 
numbered columns in Table 5 omit the county time trends, while county time trends are included in 
the even numbered specifications. We estimate separate regressions for any work loss days, 2 or 
more work loss days, 5 or more work loss days, and 10 or more work loss days. We generally find no 
effect of PSL mandates on work loss days in our DD models and note that several of the 
specifications in Table 5 fail to exhibit parallel trends between the treatment and control counties in 
the pre-enactment period.  
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 consistently indicate that workers in counties that enact 
PSL mandates report greater access to PSL compared to workers in counties with no mandated PSL 
requirement. However, since a large share of workers in our sample reported access to PSL in the 
absence of mandate, our results likely underestimate the gain in PSL access for those most affected 
by mandatory PSL legislation. This notion is supported by the much larger effect we estimate for 
workers in low-PSL industries. To shed additional light on the effect of a PSL mandate on PSL 
access and work absences for those most likely to benefit from the legislation we modify our 
empirical strategy and estimate a triple-difference (DDD) model that allows the effect of a PSL 
mandate to differ by the probability that a worker lacks access to PSL prior to the mandate taking 
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effect.12 The first step in our DDD analysis is to estimate the probability that a worker in our sample 
lacks PSL coverage using data from time periods before actual adoption for our treatment counties 
or before the randomly assigned pseudo-enactment date for control counties. We use a logistic 
regression model that includes the same individual demographic characteristics found in Equation 
(1), as well as income, firm size, and codes for specific industry of employment.13 After obtaining the 
predicted probability that a worker lacks PSL coverage, we estimate the following DDD 
specification: 
 
(2)  !",$,% = ' + )5*+,$,% + )6*789. (*+,)",$,% + )=*+,$,%×*789. (*+,)",$,% + -.",$,% +/0$,% + 1$ + 2% + 1$×2% + 4",$,%        
 
Equation (2) is similar to Equation (1) but allows the effect of PSL mandate enactment to vary 
by the probability of lacking PSL coverage prior to mandate enactment. Specifically, the coefficient 
of interest, )=, measures the impact of a PSL mandate on an individual who is predicted to gain PSL 
coverage. The coefficient )5represents the effect of mandate enactment on those with PSL coverage 
prior to the mandate (i.e., predicted probability of lacking PSL access equals zero). The coefficient )6 is then the difference in outcomes for those with no PSL benefits compared to those with PSL 
benefits when no mandate is in place. Notably, the coefficients from our DD and DDD models are 
not directly comparable. The DD coefficient of interest in Equation (1) measures the effect of a PSL 
																																																						
12 We choose to conduct a DDD analysis rather than simply examining work absences for those in low-PSL industries 
for two reasons: first, there may be characteristics besides industry associated with the likelihood of PSL coverage that 
would be captured by our predication model; and second, limiting our sample to low-PSL industries reduces our sample 
size by more than half. The DDD model allows us to retain our full sample while focusing specifically on those most 
likely to be affected by PSL legislation. 
13 We exclude income and firm size from our main analyses because it may be related to the enactment of a PSL 
mandate. We include both in our probability model since we estimate this model for the time before any PSL mandate. 
Estimates for this prediction model are reported in Appendix Table 3.  	
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mandate on workers in treatment counties compared to workers in control counties (in other words, 
this is an intent-to-treat estimate). The DDD coefficient of interest in Equation (2) estimates the 
effect of a PSL mandate on workers in treatment counties who are more likely to gain PSL 
compared to those in treatment counties who are less likely to gain PSL (i.e., a treatment-on-the-
treated effect). 
Table 6 displays results from our DDD model on the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access for 
those most likely to be affected by a mandate. Column (1) contains results from a specification that 
includes demographic and county controls, but omits industry controls and county time trends. 
Column (2) repeats the analysis with the addition of county controls, while Column (3) adds county 
time trends. All three columns suggest that PSL mandates result in large and statistically significant 
increases in PSL access for those most likely to gain coverage. In each case, a PSL mandate increases 
access by more than 7 percentage points. The coefficient on the Prob.(PSL) term clearly indicates 
that our predication model is successful at identifying individuals who, in the absence of a mandate, 
would be especially likely to lack PSL coverage, while the statistically insignificant coefficient 
estimates on PSL Mandate are expected given that this represents the effect of a mandate on those 
with PSL coverage already in place. Estimates in panel B provide evidence of parallel pre-period 
trends in our DDD specifications.14  
After confirming that PSL mandates increase access to paid leave and that the effect is larger for 
those most likely to gain coverage, we again turn to the effect of PSL mandates on work absences by 
re-estimating our DDD model in Equation (2) using work loss days in the past 12 months for illness 
or injury as the dependent variable. Results are included in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) contain 
estimates for the effect of PSL mandates on reporting any work loss days in the past 12 months due 
																																																						
14 The parallel trends test for the DDD model is similar to that described for the DD model except that we now interact 
the indicator for whether a county ever adopts a PSL mandate with both the continuous year measure and with the 
Prob.(PSL) variable from Equation (3). We also include all two-way interactions between these variables. 
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to illness or injury. When county time trends are omitted in Column (1), we find that those who are 
most likely to lack PSL coverage are less likely to report any work loss days in the absence of a PSL 
mandate. This finding is consistent with earlier research indicating those with no access to PSL are 
less likely to miss work when ill (DeRigne et al., 2016; Susser and Ziebarth, 2016). Estimates of the 
interaction term in Columns (1) and (2) show no statistically significant increase in the probability of 
experiencing a work loss day after the enactment of a PSL mandate for those most likely to be 
affected, though the coefficient is positive. Interestingly, the coefficient on the indicator for whether 
a county has enacted a PSL mandate is negative and statistically significant. This estimate represents 
the impact of a PSL mandate on those who already have PSL coverage in place. While we expected 
this coefficient to be zero in regressions of PSL mandates on PSL access, in this case that 
expectation would no longer hold. If access to PSL reduces instances of presenteeism and the 
spread of communicable disease, then those with existing PSL access could plausibly benefit from a 
mandate. We return to this point below, but note that others have found evidence that PSL 
mandates reduce presenteeism through disease transmission rates (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a). Our 
estimate in Column (1) suggests that the enactment of a PSL mandate reduces the likelihood of a 
work absence due to illness or injury by 4.2 percentage points, a reduction of approximately 10%. 
When we add county time trends to our specification in Column (2), this effect is no longer 
statistically significant, but the sign of the coefficient is still negative and similar in magnitude.  
Moving to Columns (3) and (4), it appears that PSL mandates increase the probability that those 
most likely to gain PSL access report at least 2 work loss days due to illness or injury by 
approximately 4.6 percentage points. This effect is quite large in relative terms, representing a 13.4% 
increase off of the sample mean, and is largely unaffected by the inclusion of county time trends in 
the regression model. Columns (5) and (6) suggest that the positive relationship between PSL 
mandates and work loss days for the targeted population continues when moving to 5 or more work 
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loss days. Here the effect of the mandate is still large in magnitude, though only borderline 
statistically significant. Finally, Columns (7) and (8) contain estimates for 10 or more work loss days. 
Coefficient estimates are now quite small and statistically insignificant, indicating no effect of PSL 
mandates on 10 or more work loss days. 
While our findings indicate that PSL mandates increase work absences for those gaining access 
to PSL coverage, the relatively small sample sizes in the NHIS mean that our estimates are 
somewhat imprecise. To address this concern, we supplement our estimates from the NHIS with 
data from the CPS-ASEC, which affords us a much larger sample for our analysis. While the CPS-
ASEC significantly increases our sample size, the survey contains only very limited information on 
access to PSL.15 Therefore, we use the NHIS to calculate the mean rate of PSL access in the absence 
of a mandate for 30 separate groups defined by age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64), 
education (high school or less, some college, and college graduate), and gender. We then estimate 
the following version of Equation (3) using the CPS-ASEC sample and the PSL access rates for each 
of the 30 groups: 
 
(3) !",$,% = ' + )5*+,$,  + )6*+,$,%×*789. (*+,)> + -.",$,% + /0$,% + 1$ + ?% + @> +1$×2% + 4",$,% 
 
Where Prob.(PSL)g is the mean rate of PSL access for each of the 30 groups, lg is an indicator for 
each of the 30 groups, and all of the remaining variables are as previously defined. In this 
specification, )6, measures the effect of a PSL mandate on those gaining PSL coverage. To calculate 
the dependent variable in Equation (3) we follow the BLS definition of a work absence, which 
																																																						
15 The CPS-ASEC asks whether a worker who was absent from work in the past week was paid for their absence. It is 
not possible to discern whether a worker who was not absent from work in the past week had access to PSL. 
	 20	
includes “instances when persons who usually work 35 or more hours per week worked less than 35 
hours during the reference week”. Additionally, the CPS-ASEC asks the reason for this reduction in 
work hours and we use this information to construct a measure of work absences due to “illness or 
health/medical limitation”.  
Results for reporting any illness-related work absence using the CPS-ASEC sample are presented 
in Table 8. The first column includes coefficient estimates from a DD model similar to Equation (1), 
while Columns 2 through 5 contain estimates from the DDD model described in Equation (3). DD 
estimates in Column (1) indicate a small negative effect of PSL mandates on work absences for 
workers in treatment counties compared to those in control counties. The coefficient is marginally 
statistically significant, though small in magnitude, and suggests that the overall effect of mandate 
enactment on work absences is negligible. The DDD estimates in Table 8, however, show strong 
effects of mandates for both those gaining access and those with existing PSL coverage in the 
absence of a mandate. Our estimates suggest that PSL mandates increase the likelihood of an illness-
related work absence in the past week by 2.5 percentage points for those gaining coverage, a relative 
increase of nearly 140%, compared to those with prior PSL coverage. This finding is similar to our 
earlier estimates of the effect of PSL mandates on work absences using the NHIS data reported in 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. In addition, estimates of the coefficient on the PSL mandate term in 
Table 8 indicate that the enactment of a mandate affects the probability of a work absence for those 
with existing PSL coverage. Following a PSL mandate, those unaffected workers see a decline in the 
likelihood of reporting an illness-related work absence of nearly 2 percentage points. Though 
identifying the mechanism for this spillover effect is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that 
these results are consistent with evidence that PSL mandates reduce presenteeism and the 
transmission of contagious illnesses (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a).  
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Finally, Figure 3 plots event study estimates of the effect of a PSL mandate on the likelihood of 
an illness-related work absence in the past week using the CPS-ASEC data. We estimate an event 
study model similar to Equation (3), but include individual interactions with years immediately 
preceding and following a county’s adoption of a PSL mandate. We designate period 0 as the year in 
which the mandate took effect and omit the preceding year so that coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the change in work absences compared to the year before the enactment of a PSL 
mandate. The coefficients are then plotted for the three years following the mandate’s enactment 
and three years preceding enactment. The coefficient estimates in Figure 3 represent the effect of 
PSL mandates on illness-related work absences for those most likely to gain PSL coverage compared 
to those with PSL coverage in place prior to a mandate. Figure 3 shows no evidence of a change in 
illness-related work absences for those gaining coverage in the periods before a mandate took effect. 
However, we see a slight increase in the likelihood of an illness-related work absence occurring in 
the year that the mandate took effect (period 0) and a large increase in the first full year following 
the mandates enactment (period 1). Compared to those unaffected by the mandate, those gaining 
coverage increase their probability of reporting an illness-related work absence by approximately 5 
percentage points in period 1. The increase in work absences for the affected group falls in the 
second year after the mandate becomes effective and then rises again in the third year. We highlight 
two additional features of the event-study model that relate to our previous analyses. First, a lack of 
a pre-period effect on work absences indicates that firms are not increasing their PSL coverage in 
anticipation of mandate enactment and, secondly, we appear to be justified in omitting the year of 
enactment from our earlier models. Since PSL accrues over time, many workers will not have access 
to paid leave days for several months following the enactment of a mandate. 
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6. Discussion 
Legislative mandates for paid sick leave (PSL) benefits are a relatively recent phenomenon in the 
U.S. Beginning with San Francisco in 2007, several cities, counties and states now require employers 
to provide their workers with paid leave for illness or injury (National Partnership for Women & 
Families 2016). Despite strong public support for expanding PSL coverage, legislators in 19 states 
have banned municipal-level PSL mandates citing concerns over costs to businesses and rising rates 
of employee absenteeism (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017b). Evidence to support these concerns, 
however, is minimal as the relationship between PSL mandates in the U.S. and labor market 
outcomes remains unclear.  
Our goal in this paper was to first establish a link between the enactment of a PSL mandate and 
access to PSL coverage. Since many employers provide PSL benefits in the absence of a mandate, 
the effect on access to coverage is not evident ex-ante and represents a crucial first-step to 
quantifying the labor market effects of PSL mandates. Furthermore, if firms respond to costly 
mandates by altering their workforce or relocating, then any change in access to PSL benefits would 
be minimal. Our results indicate that, overall, PSL mandates increase access to paid leave by 4.1 
percentage points compared to counties where no mandate exists. This represents a relative increase 
in PSL coverage of approximately 7 percent and is concentrated among women, white non-
Hispanics, and those working in industries with low levels of PSL coverage prior to the mandate. 
The finding that mandates are associated with small gains in PSL coverage can explain why studies 
of the supply-side labor market effects of PSL mandates in the U.S. have found minimal impacts on 
employment and wages (Ahn and Ylowitz, 2015; Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017b). However, when we 
shift our focus to those most affected by a mandate, we find that the effect of a PSL mandate on 
access to coverage nearly doubles to 7.4 percentage points; a relative increase of 13 percent. This 
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much more substantial effect highlights the importance of concentrating on the population targeted 
by the mandates.  
 We then turn to the relationship between PSL access and the likelihood that a worker reports an 
illness-related work absence. Overall, our difference-in-differences models suggest that PSL 
mandates are associated with a small decline in illness-related work absences, though some 
specifications fail to satisfy the assumption of parallel trends in the pre-period. In an effort to refine 
our analysis, we estimate a triple-difference model that allows us to observe the effects of PSL 
mandates on those gaining coverage and on those with a high likelihood of PSL coverage prior to 
mandate enactment. Our application of this strategy is novel to the literature on PSL and provides a 
unique perspective on potential spillovers to populations not directly affected by a PSL mandate. 
Using two distinct datasets, we find strikingly similar results: workers gaining access to PSL benefits 
following the enactment of a mandate are approximately 2.5 percentage points more likely to report 
a recent illness-related work absence. Estimates from an event-study model suggest that much of the 
effect on absences occurs in the calendar year following the enactment of a mandate, which is 
consistent with an initial accrual period; a feature that is common to all of the mandates that we 
study. When examining intensive margin changes in absenteeism, we find particularly large effects at 
the thresholds of reporting at least 2 work absences and at least 5 work absences. This effect 
declines monotonically from at least 2 work absences and becomes small and statistically 
insignificant at 10 or more work absences. 
As expected, we find no access effect for those with a high probability of PSL coverage prior to 
a mandate. However, our results indicate that a PSL mandate is associated with fewer illness-related 
work absences for those with prior coverage. The magnitude of the estimated effect is similar in size 
to the increase in work absences for those gaining PSL access. Though we are not able to directly 
test the mechanism that drives these reductions in illness-related work absences, we note that this 
	 24	
finding is consistent with recent work on PSL mandates and presenteeism (Pichler and Ziebarth, 
2017a). For example, Susser and Ziebarth (2016) found presenteeism to be especially prevalent 
among low-income females; a group of workers we show experiencing larger gains in access to PSL 
following the enactment of mandate. Taken together, our results indicate that while there is some 
justification for concerns expressed over PSL mandates and increased work absences, there is also 
evidence to support a key claim made by proponents of PSL mandates, that increased access to PSL 
can improve population health.
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Figure 1: Paid Sick Leave Access Relative to Mandate Enactment 
 
Notes: 
1. Year 0 represents the quarter and year that the PSL mandate took effect in treatment counties. Control 
counties are assigned a “pseudo-enactment” period matched to the quarter and year of enactment for a random 
treatment county. 
2. Access to PSL is calculated as the unadjusted mean rate of workers in the NHIS sample who report access to 
paid sick leave. 
 
Figure 2: Work Absence over the Past 12 Months due to Illness or Injury 
 
Notes: 
1. Year 0 represents the quarter and year that the PSL mandate took effect in treatment counties. Control 
counties are assigned a “pseudo-enactment” period matched to the quarter and year of enactment for a random 
treatment county. 
2. A work absence is defined as a work loss day to an injury or illness and is calculated as the unadjusted mean 
rate of workers in the sample who report a work loss day in the past 12 months. 
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Figure 3: Triple Difference Event Study Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on 
Any Work Absence due to Illness or Health/Medical Limitation – CPS Sample 
 
Notes: 
1. Year 0 represents the year that the PSL mandate took effect in treatment counties.  
2. Absences are defined as instances when persons who usually work 35 or more hours per week worked less than 
35 hours during the reference week because of an illness or health/medical limitation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for NHIS Sample 
 Treatment Counties Control Counties 
Female 0.510 0.495 
Age 38.4 38.6 
White, non-Hispanic 0.410 0.449 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.205 0.212 
Hispanic 0.245 0.279 
Other race, non-Hispanic 0.139 0.059 
Federal Poverty Level < 1.0 0.108 0.103 
Federal Poverty Level 1.0 – 
1.99 
0.140 0.167 
Federal Poverty Level 2.0 – 
2.99 
0.123 0.155 
Federal Poverty Level 3.0 – 
3.99 
0.097 0.118 
Federal Poverty Level 4.0+ 0.365 0.297 
Federal Poverty Level Missing 0.168 0.162 
Less than High School 0.125 0.135 
High School Graduate or 
GED 
0.194 0.234 
Some College or Associate’s 
Degree 
0.233 0.321 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.285 0.213 
Graduate or Professional 
Degree 
0.154 0.092 
Education Missing 0.009 0.004 
Married 0.343 0.400 
Widowed 0.014 0.016 
Divorced 0.092 0.133 
Separated 0.038 0.038 
Never Married 0.436 0.332 
Living with a Partner 0.071 0.076 
Marital Status Missing 0.005 0.003 
Private Health Insurance 0.693 0.690 
Medicaid Health Insurance 0.091 0.034 
Military Health Insurance 0.004 0.015 
Other Health Insurance 0.063 0.070 
Health Insurance Missing 0.004 0.004 
No Health Insurance 0.170 0.229 
   
Observations 7,390 26,951 
Notes: 
1. Data are from the 2005 through 2015 waves of the NHIS. 
2. Treatment counties include those enacting a PSL mandate between 2007 and 2014, while control counties are 
those with no PSL mandate in place over this time period. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Paid Sick Leave Adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.017 
(0.024) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Age 18-34  Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Age 35-44 -0.051* 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
Age 45-54 -0.038 
(0.039) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
Age 55-64 -0.060 
(0.047) 
-0.036 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
White Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Black -0.006 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
Hispanic -0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.025 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
Asian 0.222 
(0.154) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
0.046 
(0.040) 
Other Race/Ethnicity -0.059 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
Less than High School Omitted Omitted Omitted 
High School -0.062 
(0.048) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
Some College -0.095* 
(0.056) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
College or Greater -0.012 
(0.049) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
Family Income < $25k Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Family Income $25k-$49,999 0.030 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Family Income $50k-$74,999 0.033 
(0.025) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
Family Income > $75k 0.020 
(0.028) 
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Privately Insured Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Medicare Coverage -0.146 
(0.091) 
-0.047 
(0.055) 
0.019 
(0.051) 
Medicaid Coverage 0.038 
(0.067) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
V.A. Coverage -0.073** 
(0.029) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Uninsured -0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Medicare Spending 
(thousand $) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
Per Capita Hospital Days 0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
Per Capita Outpatient Visits 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
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(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate 0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Agriculture Industry Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Mining Industry 0.203** 
(0.088) 
-0.044 
(0.039) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
Construction Industry 0.113** 
(0.051) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
Manufacturing Industry 0.123** 
(0.057) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
Transportation & Utilities  0.102* 
(0.061) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
Wholesale Trade Industries 0.080 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
Retail Trade Industries 0.136** 
(0.066) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate 
0.155** 
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.027) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
Business and Repair Services 0.187* 
(0.098) 
0.038 
(0.026) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
Personal Services 0.152* 
(0.078) 
-0.009 
(0.038) 
0.004 
(0.021) 
Entertainment and 
Recreation Services 
0.080 
(0.066) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
Professional and Related 
Services 
0.166** 
(0.079) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
  
County Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
County Time Trend No No Yes 
R2 0.077 0.326 0.596 
Observations 3,489 3,489 3,489 
Notes:  
1. Observations are at the county-year level for years 2005 through 2015 using data from the CPS-ASEC. 
2. All regressions include year fixed effects and are weighted by county population.  
3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. 
4. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to 
Paid Sick Leave 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:     
PSL Mandate 0.041** 
(0.021) 
0.038* 
(0.020) 
0.041* 
(0.022) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
     
Panel B:     
Parallel Trends Test 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
     
Industry Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
County Controls No No Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend No No No Yes 
     
Mean PSL Access 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.585 
Observations 33,679 33,679 33,679 33,679 
Notes:  
1. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. 
born, and county and year fixed effects. 
2. Industry controls include indicators for 22 separate industry categories (see Appendix Table 2 for details). 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per 
capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county 
unemployment rate. 
4. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Difference-in-difference Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to 
Paid Sick Leave by Subgroup 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Subgroup Women Men White, non-
Hispanic 
Non-White 
or Hispanic 
Low PSL 
Industries 
Panel A:      
PSL Mandate 0.042** 
(0.019) 
0.038 
(0.029) 
0.049* 
(0.029) 
0.036* 
(0.022) 
0.080** 
(0.040) 
      
Panel B:      
Parallel Trends Test 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
      
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Mean PSL Access 0.597 0.573 0.656 0.528 0.406 
Observations 16,817 16,862 14,901 18,778 14,270 
Notes:  
1. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. 
born, and county and year fixed effects. 
2. Industry controls include indicators for 22 separate industry categories (see Appendix Table 2 for details). 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per 
capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county 
unemployment rate. 
4. Low PSL industries are defined as those industries where fewer than the overall mean share of workers report 
access to paid sick leave prior to the enactment of a PSL mandate. 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
6. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Difference-in-difference Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Work Absences Due to Illness or Injury 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Any Work Loss Days 2 or More Work Loss 
Days 
5 or More Work Loss 
Days 
10 or More Work Loss 
Days 
Panel A:         
PSL Mandate -0.033** 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
         
Panel B:         
Parallel Trends 
Test 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
         
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-Time 
Trend 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Mean PSL Access 0.433 0.433 0.344 0.344 0.136 0.136 0.060 0.060 
Observations 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 
Notes:  
1. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. born, and county and year fixed effects. 
2. Industry controls include indicators for 22 separate industry categories (see Appendix Table 2 for details). 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and 
Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county unemployment rate. 
4. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Triple Difference Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid 
Sick Leave 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A:    
PSL Mandate x p(PSL) 0.072*** 
(0.018) 
0.073** 
(0.018) 
0.074*** 
(0.018) 
PSL Mandate 0.012 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
p(PSL) -1.056*** 
(0.035) 
-1.118*** 
(0.045) 
-1.113*** 
(0.045) 
    
Panel B:    
Parallel Trends Test -0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
    
Industry Controls No Yes Yes 
County Controls Yes Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend No No Yes 
    
Mean PSL Access 0.585 0.585 0.585 
Observations 33,679 33,679 33,679 
 Notes:  
1. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. 
born, and county and year fixed effects. 
2. Industry controls include indicators for 22 separate industry categories (see Appendix Table 2 for details). 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per 
capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county 
unemployment rate. 
4. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Triple Difference Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Work Absences Due to Illness or Injury 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Any Work Loss Days 2 or More Work Loss 
Days 
5 or More Work Loss 
Days 
10 or More Work Loss 
Days 
Panel A:         
PSL Mandate x 
p(PSL) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.046** 
(0.023) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
PSL Mandate -0.042** 
(0.017) 
-0.032 
(0.027) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
p(PSL) -0.285*** 
(0.067) 
-0.287*** 
(0.067) 
-0.206*** 
(0.063) 
-0.205*** 
(0.063) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
         
Panel B:         
Parallel Trends Test 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
         
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Mean Worker Share 0.433 0.433 0.344 0.344 0.136 0.136 0.060 0.060 
Observations 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 30,831 
Notes:  
1. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. born, and county and year fixed effects. 
2. Industry controls include indicators for 22 separate industry categories (see Appendix Table 2 for details). 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and 
Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county unemployment rate. 
4. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
	 38	
Table 8: Estimates of the Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Any Work Absence due to Illness 
or Health/Medical Limitation – CPS Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DD DDD DDD DDD DDD 
Panel A:      
PSL Mandate x 
p(PSL) 
- 0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
PSL Mandate -0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
      
Industry Controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
County Controls Yes No No Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend Yes No No No Yes 
      
Mean Worker Share 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Observations 298,809 298,809 298,809 298,809 298,809 
 Notes:  
1. Data are from the CPS-ASEC between the years of 2005 and 2015 and define a work absence due to illness or 
health/medical limitation as instances when persons who usually work 35 or more hours per week worked less 
than 35 hours during the reference week because of an illness or health/medical limitation. 
2. All regressions include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, U.S. 
born, county and year fixed effects. DDD models include group fixed effects. 
3. County controls include number of medical doctors, family doctors, and general practitioners per capita, per 
capita inpatient days and outpatient visits, and Medicare Parts A and B expenditures, and the county 
unemployment rate. 
4. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level. 
5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1: Municipal and State Paid Sick Leave Mandates, 2005 – 2014 
Municipality or State Effective Date Scope of Coverage Accrual Period 
San Francisco, CA 2/5/2007 All workers 1 hour for every 30 hours worked 
Washington DC 11/13/2008 All workers except independent 
contractors, students, certain health 
care workers, certain unpaid volunteers, 
and casual babysitters. 
• Firms with 24 or fewer workers: 1 hour 
for every 87 hours worked 
• Firms with 25-99 workers: 1 hour for 
every 43 hours worked 
• Firms with 100 or more workers: 1 hour 
for every 37 hours worked 
Connecticut 1/1/2012 Hourly workers in the service sector 
working for firms with 50 or more 
employees. 
1 hour for every 40 hours worked 
Seattle, WA 9/1/2012 Workers in firms with more than 4 
employees completing more than 240 
annual hours of work. 
• Firms with more than 4, but fewer than 
250 workers: 1 hour for every 40 hours 
worked 
• Firms with more than 250 workers: 1 
hour for every 30 hours worked 
New York, NY 6/26/2013 Workers in firms with more than 5 
employees completing more than 80 
annual hours of work with certain 
exemptions. 
1 hour for every 30 hours worked 
Portland, OR 1/1/2014 Workers in firms with more than 5 
employees completing 240 or more 
annual hours of work. 
1 hour for every 30 hours worked up to a 
maximum of 40 accrued hours 
Jersey City, NJ 1/22/2014 Private sector workers completing 80 
or more annual hours of work and 
working for a minimum of 90 days. 
• Firms with fewer than 10 workers: 1 
hour for every 30 hours worked up to a 
maximum of 24 hours 
• Firms with 10 or more workers: 1 hour 
for every 30 hours worked up to a 
maximum of 40 hours 
Newark, NJ 1/29/2014 Same as Jersey City Same as Jersey City 
Notes: 
1. We rely on information provided by the Work and Family Legal Center (2016), the National Partnership for Women and Families (2016), and Pichler and 
Ziebarth (2017b) for the information in this table. 
2. Philadelphia, PA; Oakland, CA; and the states of California and Massachusetts all passed a PSL mandates in 2015, however because we exclude the first year 
after the enactment of a PSL mandate for our analysis of work absences, we do not include these mandates in our sample.
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Appendix Table 2: NHIS Industry Classifications 
*Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting Industries 
Mining Industries 
Utilities Industries 
*Construction Industries 
Manufacturing Industries 
Wholesale Trade Industries 
Retail Trade Industries 
Transportation and Warehousing Industries 
Information Industries 
Finance and Insurance Industries 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing Industries 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services Industries 
Management of Companies and Enterprises Industries 
*Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation 
Education Services Industries 
Health Care and Social Assistance Industries 
*Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Industries 
*Accommodation and Food Services Industries 
*Other Services (expect Public Administration Industries) 
Public Administration Industries 
Armed Forces 
Industry Unknown 
Notes: 
1. * indicates that the industry is included in the “Low PSL” sample in Table 4. These are industries in which 
fewer than the overall mean share of workers report access to PSL prior to the enactment of a mandate. 
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Appendix Table 3: Characteristics Associated with Lacking Access to Paid Sick Leave 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Demographics   
Intercept -0.876** 0.4322 
<50% FPL 0.8608*** 0.1089 
50-74% FPL 0.7387*** 0.1192 
75 to 99% FPL 0.463*** 0.0996 
100-124% FPL 0.1787* 0.0913 
125-149% FPL 0.2585*** 0.0909 
150-174% FPL 0.2292** 0.0901 
175-199% FPL -0.0593 0.0886 
200-249% FPL -0.0973 0.0710 
250-299% FPL -0.1964*** 0.0724 
300-349% FPL -0.2062*** 0.0774 
350-399% FPL -0.4464*** 0.0842 
400-449% FPL -0.3727*** 0.0867 
450-499% FPL -0.2769*** 0.0926 
>=500% FPL -0.5121*** 0.0597 
Missing FPL Omitted Omitted 
Married 0.5161* 0.2921 
Widowed 0.3952 0.3179 
Divorced 0.3704 0.2945 
Separated 0.2363 0.3020 
Never Married 0.3682 0.2928 
Living with a Partner 0.5403* 0.2977 
Marital Status Missing Omitted Omitted 
White, non-Hispanic 0.2402*** 0.0759 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.0643 0.0747 
Hispanic -0.1072 0.0806 
Other race, non-Hispanic Omitted Omitted 
Less Than High School 0.5062*** 0.0842 
High School Graduate or GED 0.2784*** 0.0744 
Some College or Associates Degree 0.2985*** 0.0710 
Bachelor’s Degree -0.0063 0.0717 
Graduate or Professional Degree Omitted Omitted 
Female -0.0069 0.0363 
US Born -0.1306*** 0.0481 
Health Insurance   
Private Health Insurance -1.0946*** 0.1874 
Medicaid Health Insurance 0.4119** 0.1969 
Military Health Care 0.1913 0.1984 
State-sponsored Health Plan 0.4753** 0.2150 
Other Government Plan 0.3613* 0.2115 
Single Service Plan -0.1512 0.1008 
No Coverage of Any Type 0.6898*** 0.1912 
Health Insurance Missing -0.4833 0.3272 
Industry   
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Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 1.2259** 0.5414 
Mining -0.2310 0.2712 
Utilities -0.6408** 0.2674 
Construction 1.1155*** 0.1141 
Manufacturing 0.0117 0.1072 
Wholesale Trade -0.1627 0.1328 
Retail Trade 0.2408** 0.1036 
Transportation and Warehousing 0.1026 0.1159 
Information -0.3657** 0.1425 
Finance and Insurance -0.6672*** 0.1202 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.3576*** 0.1354 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services -0.1238 0.1121 
Management of Companies and Enterprises -0.6577 0.5889 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management 0.7943*** 0.1147 
Education Services 0.0993 0.1295 
Health Care and Social Assistance -0.2885*** 0.1035 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 0.7396*** 0.1361 
Accommodation and Food Services 0.9632*** 0.1087 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 0.6411*** 0.1158 
Public Administration -1.2393*** 0.4544 
Armed Forces -8.7753 118.0000 
Unknown Omitted Omitted 
Employer Size 0.0005 0.0008 
County controls   
Per Capita Physicians -31.6312** 15.2807 
Per Capita General Practitioners -955.9000 947.3000 
Per Capita Family Practitioners 2101.8** 1041.8000 
Per Capita Hospital Days 0.0302 0.0638 
Per Capita Outpatient Days 0.0403* 0.0206 
Medicare Spending 0.0000 0.0000 
Unemployment Rate 0.0209*** 0.0081 
   
Observations 21,705  
 Notes: 
1. Estimates are from a logistic regression model with lacking access to paid sick leave as the dependent variable. 
2. Regression includes individual age dummies which we omit from the table to conserve space. 
3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
